See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70, 124125 (1995), (Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, only by ignoring Grutters reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compelling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of Grutter. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 41% white and 59% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. 72); Brief for Respondents in No. 05915, p.7, n.4; Tr. Today, they are not. VII, 1, ch. At least one of the academic articles the dissent cites to support this proposition fails to establish a causal connection between the supposed educational gains realized by black students and racial mixing. In Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499 (2005), this Court considered a California prison policy that separated inmates racially. See, e.g., Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, No. The plans are tied to each districts specific racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits. Hence, I am not surprised that Justice Kennedy finds that, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population, including a racially diverse population. And it thereby required, for example, all fourth grade students from the previously black and previously white schools first to attend together what would now be a mixed fourth grade at one of the school buildings and then the next year to attend what would now be a mixed fifth grade at the other school building. The Ninth Circuit dismissed fairly briefly the contention that PICS did not have a personal stake or suffer an actual injury, reasoning that it was satisfied because some of the parents had children who would reach high school age within the next several years. The NAACPs First Legal Challenge and Seattles Response, 1969 to 1977. See id., at 380 (The very analysis for dissolving desegregation decrees supports continued maintenance of a desegregated system as a compelling state interest). See Barresi v. Browne, 226 Ga. 456, 456459, 175 S.E. 2d 649, 650651 (1970). The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document that would transmit its basic values to future generations through principles that remained workable over time. in No. Here again, though, the dissent overstates the data that supposedly support the interest. In Seattle, the parties settled after the school district pledged to undertake a desegregation plan. The District asserts that it helped these schools by allowing students from the schools to attend other schools, furthering the goals of ending racial isolation and promoting equal access. They constitute but one part of plans that depend primarily upon other, nonracial elements. tutional Provisions in the States Where Segregation in Education is Institutionalized). Approximately half the districts public school enrollment was black; about half was white. No. We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified. Johnson, 543 U. S., at 506, n.1. Applying these precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law. Id., at 229230 (internal quotation marks omitted). For this purpose, administrators cataloged the racial makeup of each neighborhood housing block. As a matter of social experimentation, the laws in question must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. 214a, 225a, 257a. 1, No. If so, its interpretation threatens to produce divisiveness among minority groups that is incompatible with the basic objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment. The government bears the burden of justifying its use of individual racial classifications. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. In making such a determination, we have deferred to state authorities only once, see Grutter, 539 U. S., at 328330, and that deference was prompted by factors uniquely relevant to higher education. But that cost does not approach, in degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and 80 years of legal racial segregation. Thus, at worst, a student would have to spend one year at a high school he did not pick as a first or second choice. We defend only the validity of the statute that enables the Topeka Board of Education to determine its own course). Considering the precedent of Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), which is only partly applicable because it concerns higher education, it is apparent that educational institutions must use diversity as one of several admissions criteria rather than setting strict quotas. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 328, in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny purposes, a government interest in student body diversity in the context of higher education is compelling. The decision was a 5-4 split on the Court, with both sides claiming that their position was truest to the precedent set in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). By finding the School Districts plan unconstitutional, districts will be limited in their ability to provide such benefits. Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that [a]t the heart of the Constitutions guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 602 (OConnor, J., dissenting); internal quotation marks omitted). The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. Grutter, supra, at 353 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Arkansas, for example, provides by statute that [n]o student may transfer to a nonresident district where the percentage of enrollment for the students race exceeds that percentage in the students resident district. Ark. of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a federal question a challenge to a voluntary statewide integration plan using express racial criteria). Cf. Id., at 43. 1, 426 F. 3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. Wash., 2001). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. Resort to the record, including the parties Stipulation of Facts, further confuses the matter. Here, Roberts provides the following string citation: Here Roberts cites: "See 539 U.S., at 320, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. See Chevron U. S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 845 (1984). App. Those entrusted with directing our public schools can bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents, administrators, and other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the compelling interests they face without resorting to widespread governmental allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications. Schools argue that a diverse environment teaches students tolerance and respect, and the exposure to diverse viewpoints enhances education and dispels stereotypes. Quoting Justice Powells articulation of diversity in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 314315, the Grutter Court noted that it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the use of race, 539 U. S., at 324325, but a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element, id., at 325. In over one-third of the assignments affected by the racial tiebreaker, then, the use of race in the end made no difference, and the district could identify only 52 students who were ultimately affected adversely by the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned. 05915, at 46. Justice Stevenss reliance on School Comm. in No. Second, "the interest in diversity in higher education", as upheld in, This page was last edited on 5 February 2023, at 17:43. Does it insist upon especially strong evidence supporting inclusion of multiple minority groups in an otherwise lawful government minority-assistance program? Seattle operates a K8 African-American Academy, which has a nonwhite enrollment of 99%. If the need for the racial classifications embraced by the school districts is unclear, even on the districts own terms, the costs are undeniable. It gave fourth preference to students who received child care in the neighborhood. 2005) (" Parents IV"). 05908, at19. In briefing and argument before this Court, Seattle contends that its use of race helps to reduce racial concentration in schools and to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable schools. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). So, the argument proceeds, if race is the problem, then perhaps race is the solution. I cannot rely upon Swanns statement that the use of race-conscious limits is permissible without showing, rather than simply asserting, that the statement represents a constitutional principle firmly rooted in federal and state law. See also Hanawalt 31; Pub. in No. 6. 1986) (citing Swann and North Carolina Bd. 05-908, at 38a-39a, 45a. 2, p.7 (Local self-government in local affairs is essential to the peace and happiness of each locality and to the strength and stability of our whole federal system. Here the most Jefferson County itself claims is that because the guidelines provide a firm definition of the Boards goal of racially integrated schools, they provide administrators with the authority to facilitate, negotiate and collaborate with principals and staff to maintain schools within the 1550% range. Brief in Opposition in No. 11246, 30 Fed. in No. It set forth its view prominently in an important opinion joined by all nine Justices, knowing that it would be read and followed throughout the Nation. However, Roberts considers that this interest is not compelling and that the use of race for this goal is not narrowly tailored, it is instead used for racial balancing, which is unconstitutional. Four basic considerations have led me to this view. . in No. According to the schools most recent annual report, [a]cademic excellence is its primary goal. See African American Academy 2006 Annual Report, p.2, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/area/ See Grutter, supra, at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (allowing consideration of race only if it does not become a predominant factor). There is no rule that the same level of scrutiny should apply to all racial classifications, especially when some classifications exclude people from participation, while others are designed to include them. Elementary schools in central Seattle were between 60% and 80% black; Garfield, the central district high school, was more than 50% minority; schools outside the central and southeastern sections of Seattle were virtually all white. 1", Learn how and when to remove this template message, Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, "PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE: THE END OF RACE BASED SCHOOL POPULATIONS", "Schools Are More Segregated Today Than During the Late 1960s", "PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. 2d 834, 839840, and n. 6 (WD Ky. 2004) (McFarland I). 2d 304 (quoting Bakke, supra, at 315, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. Ed. remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 3839, 82. 2, p. 83 (It [South Carolina] is confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality for all of its children of whatever race or color. With this factual background in mind, I turn to the legal question: Does the United States Constitution prohibit these school boards from using race-conscious criteria in the limited ways at issue here? This case was brought by a non-profit organization, Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS), representing parents of students in the Seattle School District (District) who objected to the school districts use of race as a tiebreaker for admission to schools as violating the Equal Protection Clause. The districts assert, as they must, that the way in which they have employed individual racial classifications is necessary to achieve their stated ends. While this Court has permitted the States to legislate or otherwise officially act experimentally in the social and economic fields, it has always recognized and held that this power is subject to the limitations of the Constitution, and that the tests of the Constitution must be met); Reply Brief for Appellants in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. ospi.k12. School Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (CA4 1999); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809 (CA1 1998). As the Court notes, we recognized the compelling nature of the interest in remedying past intentional discrimination in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494 (1992), and of the interest in diversity in higher education in Grutter. The dissents reliance on this Courts precedents to justify the explicit, sweeping, classwide racial classifications at issue here is a misreading of our authorities that, it appears to me, tends to undermine well-accepted principles needed to guard our freedom. It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954. Magnet and Traditional are exempt from this ratio per the 2000 and 2003 Court Order. Franklin was integration positive because its nonwhite enrollment the previous school year was greater than 69 percent; 89 more white students were assigned to Franklin by operation of the racial tiebreaker in the 20002001 school year than otherwise would have been. v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 45 (1971), this Court, citing Swann, restated the point. 4, p.86 ([Y]ou cannot talk about this problem just in a vacuum in the manner of a law school discussion), with post, at 57 (The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document). He made it clear that "To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society". The argument ignores the dangers presented by individual classifications, dangers that are not as pressing when the same ends are achieved by more indirect means. Is Seattle free on remand to say that its schools were de jure segregated, just as in 1956 a memo for the School Board admitted? This Court upheld the plan, see McDaniel, 402 U. S., at 41, rejecting the parents argument that a person may not be included or excluded solely because he is a Negro or because he is white. Brief for Respondents in McDaniel, O. T. 1970, No. 2, p. 79 (But be that doctrine what it may, somewhere, sometime to every principle comes a moment of repose when it has been so often announced, so confidently relied upon, so long continued, that it passes the limits of judicial discretion and disturbance. 1 Administrative Complaint in Seattle Branch, NAACP v. Seattle School Dist. The point of the narrow tailoring analysis in which the Grutter Court engaged was to ensure that the use of racial classifications was indeed part of a broader assessment of diversity, and not simply an effort to achieve racial balance, which the Court explained would be patently unconstitutional. Id., at 330. Another Connecticut regulation provides that [a]ny school in which the Proportion for the School falls outside of a range from 25 percentage points less to 25 percentage points more than the Comparable Proportion for the School District, shall be determined to be racially imbalanced. Conn. Id. Cf. In 20002001, when the racial tiebreaker was last used, Ballards total enrollment was 17.5 percent Asian-American, 10.8 percent African-American, 10.7 percent Latino, 56.4 percent Caucasian, and 4.6 percent Native-American. Second, there is an educational element: an interest in overcoming the adverse educational effects produced by and associated with highly segregated schools. Most white families live north of the downtown area where four high schools Ballard, Ingraham, Nathan Hale, and Roosevelt are located. Richmond v. J. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U. S., at 2425; North Carolina Bd. The dissents permissive strict scrutiny (which bears more than a passing resemblance to rational-basis review) could invite widespread governmental deployment of racial classifications. After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the pluralitys logic, be written out of the law. 1 L. Kohn, Priority Shift: The Fate of Mandatory Busing for School Desegregation in Seattle and the Nation 2730, 32 (Mar. The Constitution is not that malleable. 4, 1984) (1984 Memorandum); Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson County Public School District, pp. See supra, at 4648. Jefferson County assigned Joshua to another elementary school in his cluster, Young Elementary. Dawkins & Braddock 401403; Wells & Crain 550. Third, there is a democratic element: an interest in producing an educational environment that reflects the pluralistic society in which our children will live. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. See App. Indeed, the social scientists brief rather cautiously claims the existence of any benefit at all, describing the positive impact as modest, id., at 13, acknowledging that there appears to be little or no effect on math scores, id., at 14, and admitting that the underlying reasons for these gains in achievement are not entirely clear, id., at 15. Nor could it. 05908, at 7. Finally, the outcome of this case will give some perspective into how the new composition of the Supreme Court views the still controversial issue of affirmative action. No. Finally, the kind of deference that the Supreme Court will give the School District will also have implications. App. When litigation, as here, involves a complex, comprehensive plan that contains multiple strategies for achieving racially integrated schools, Brief for Respondents in No. Narrow tailoring requires serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives, Grutter, supra, at 339, and yet in Seattle several alternative assignment plansmany of which would not have used express racial classificationswere rejected with little or no consideration. Before the merits of the case can be addressed, the Court first has to address the Districts jurisdictional challenge that no case or controversy exists within the Constitutional sense of those terms. The plurality pays inadequate attention to this law, to past opinions rationales, their language, and the contexts in which they arise. See 426 F.3d, at 1208 (Bea, J., dissenting). Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1192. 254, 256, 261 (1956) (40 of Kentuckys 180 school districts began desegre- Decisions to assign students to schools within each cluster are based on available space within the schools and the racial guidelines in the Districts current student assignment plan. Id., at 38. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Black Womens Lawyers Association of Greater Chicago, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 16. Even if current social theories favor classroom racial engineering as necessary to solve the problems at hand, post, at 21, the Constitution enshrines principles independent of social theories. And the combination of the three unsubstantiated elements does not produce an interest any more compelling than that represented by each element independently. First, the race-conscious criteria at issue only help set the outer bounds of broad ranges. . In Brown V. Board of Education, the court ruled that 'separate but equal' was an unconstitutional provision and that the practice of segregation was 'inherently unequal'. 2 Id., at 151152; Hanawalt 3738; Seattle School Dist. Id., at 525528 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They further contend that the children who have yet to reach high school age fail to fulfill the first requirement because their potential injury is not imminent; they have not even applied yet and consequently any injury to them is purely hypothetical at this point. See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342 (stating the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point). And Swann, McDaniel, Crawford, North Carolina Bd. In fact, in each case the extreme measure of relying on race in assignments is unnecessary to achieve the stated goals, even as defined by the districts. In doing so, it consulted widely with parents and other members of the local community, using public presentations, public meetings, and various other methods to obtain the publics input. See also Reply Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. Roberts cites Adarand, supra, at 227, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed.
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